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Resumo: Este artigo tem como objetivo investigar o conceito de "razão humana universal" 
(allgemeine Menschenvernunft) kantiano pelo aprofundamento em seus escritos publicados e 
não publicados. Baseando-se em visões lógicas e antropológicas de Georg Friedrich Meier, 
Kant desenvolveu um modelo de razão que  reuniu demandas do Iluminismo para o aumento 
do conhecimento e luta contra os preconceitos, sem, no entanto sucumbir à perversão da 
verdade absoluta. A razão pode ser encontrada em todos, uma vez que não é exclusiva, mas 
todos tem acesso a ela apenas em parte, dado que os seres humanos inevitavelmente a 
seguem, sem, no entanto estarem cientes disso, devido a preconceitos e pontos de vista 
particulares. Na medida em que, a razão kantiana exige autonomia e comunicação, e é de 
persistente validade cultural e teórica, como é provado pelo pensamento de Hannah Arendt. 
Palavras-chave: Immanuel Kant. Georg Friedrich Meier. Hannah Arendt. Razão universal 
humana. Egoísmo lógico. Pluralismo. 
 
Abstract: This paper aims to investigate Kant’s concept of ‘universal human reason’ 
(allgemeine Menschenvernunft) by delving into his both published and unpublished writings. 
Relying on Georg Friedrich Meier’s logical and anthropological views, Kant developed a 
model of reason which met the Enlightenment’s demands for increasing knowledge and fight 
against prejudices, without however succumbing to the perversion of absolute truth. Reason 
can be found in everybody since it is non-exclusive, but everybody has access to it only in 
part since human beings unavoidably follow, without however being aware of it, 
preconceptions and private views. Insofar, Kantian reason requires both autonomy and 
communication, and is of persistent cultural and theoretical validity, as is proved by Hannah 
Arendt’s thought. 
 
Keywords: Immanuel Kant. Georg Friedrich Meier. Hannah Arendt. Universal Human 
Reason. Logical Egoism. Pluralism. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The concept of ‘reason’ (Vernunft) pervades Kant’s work in all its forms, from printed 
works to manuscripts, from letters to the transcripts of lectures. It occurs in an 
epistemological context, where it is juxtaposed to the ‘understanding’ (Verstand), in a moral 
context, where it is used to denote the act of legislating, and in anthropological and logical 
contexts, where it is the touchstone in verifying the validity of knowledge. In spite of and 
beyond all these many perspectives, which may seem disconnected from each other, it is 
possible to discern structural features in Kant’s conception of ‘reason’ which make it possible 
to understand its function within the critical system, but also and above all to see its current 
theoretical and cultural relevance. 
To achieve this, our attention will turn first to the occurrences of ‘universal human 
reason’ (allgemeine Menschenvernunft) within Kant’s corpus and sources (§ 1); then to the 
conceptual plexus that forms around this concept and includes other key-notions, such as 
‘pluralism’ (Pluralismus) and ‘broader way of thinking’ (erweiterte Denkungsart) (§ 2); 
lastly, in conclusion, to the persistent cultural and theoretical validity of the model thus 
obtained in the light of the twentieth-century’s most striking revival of this conceptual plexus: 
Hannah Arendt (§ 3). 
 
2. Universal Human Reason 
 
In the language of Kant, the noun ‘reason’ is almost always accompanied by 
qualifying adjectives, of which ‘pure’ (rein) and ‘practical’ (praktisch) are the two best 
known examples. In the present context, however, it is necessary to focus on a different pair 
of adjectives which usually excite less interest, but will serve to paint a less 
epistemologically-biased picture of Kantian thought on this topic, and which indeed turn up in 
the most disparate contexts. They are ‘universal’ (allgemein) and ‘human’ (menschlich), the 
latter often being incorporated into the noun Menschenvernunft. A survey of Kant’s Lectures 
on Logic and Anthropology, three Critiques, letters and minor essays yields some highly 
significant passages where the ‘universal human reason’ (allgemeine Menschenvernunft) 
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becomes a sort of theoretical plumb line to gauge the successfulness of every analysis 
undertaken – it bears repeating – in fields that are not necessarily contiguous.  
The pairing of these two adjectives, or rather, the resulting expression ‘universal 
human reason’ serves to convey a specific message which at once makes use of and 
transforms an idea that was central to the Enlightenment: on the one hand, reason is 
‘universal’, insofar as it is non-exclusive and is a characteristic that everyone possesses; on 
the other, reason is ‘human’, insofar as everyone has access to it only in part, in accordance 
with their own personal perspective, which is perforce limited. Everyone therefore has the 
tools to formulate correct judgments and further the pursuit of the truth, because reason is not 
a privilege of the few but a prerogative of all; yet no one can claim to be self-sufficient in this 
process because the reason that is ‘universal’ is also ‘human’, and as such it is determined and 
deformed by individual points of view and prejudices. 
This conviction took root probably towards the beginning of the ‘Sixties in 
correspondence with the anti-intellectualist development that began more or less mid-decade 
and may be attributed to readings of Rousseau and Spalding,
1
 and remained consistent 
throughout the entire period of Kant’s production. The source for the development of the idea 
is Georg Friedrich Meier, an author on whose texts Kant lectured at the University of 
Königsberg for approximately forty years, studying both the Vernunftlehre and related Auszug 
(1752), and the Beyträge zu der Lehre von den Vorurtheilen des menschlichen Geschlechts 
(1766). 
Meier speaks of the “universal human understanding [der allgemeine 
Menschenverstand]” (Vernunftlehre, p. 143, § 129), stating that “in no man is reason 
a universal reason [eine allgemeine Vernunft]”, and even that “the most reasonable 
man of all is such only in relation to certain objects of reason”, whereas “in respect 
of all other things he judges in the same hesitant, blind and impetuous manner a 
child would do” (Beyträge, p. 125).2 
Kant is influenced by both Meier’s idea and his ‘lexical mobility’, and to start with he 
does not set upon a fixed expression, using both of Meier’s nouns, Verstand and Vernunft, 
                                                          
1
 Kant himself refers to Rousseau in this regard (AA, XX, p. 44). On this see Schmucker (1961, p. 178), Zammito 
(2001; 2002, pp. 92, 114-115), and Bacin (2006, pp. 5-6). However, there is some evidence that Johann Joachim 
Spalding’s work Die Bestimmung des Menschen also played a certain role in promoting Kant’s anti-
intellectualistic turn, cf. Macor (2013a, pp. 202-205). 
2
 On Meier’s thought see Gawlick (1989), Schenk (1994), Pozzo (2000; 2005), Cataldi Madonna (2007), Godel 
(2007, pp. 94-106, 164-179). 
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interchangeably.
3
 In his letter to Lambert of 31
st
 December 1765, Kant mentions the 
“touchstone of the universal human reason [allgemeine menschliche Vernunft]” (AA, X, p. 
55), while in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics, released a 
few months later and already in press by December 1765, he resorts to the locution “universal 
human understanding [allgemeiner menschlicher Verstand]”, in reference to the impulse “to 
shift the focal point” of our tendencies “outside ourselves and to locate it in other rational 
beings”; this “makes us so heavily and so universally dependent on the judgment of others, 
and causes us to regard the approval or applause of others as so necessary to perfecting our 
own good opinion of ourselves”, a tendency which cannot be explained away through mere 
vanity, but is rather the mark of “our dependency on the universal human understanding” 
(AA, II, p. 334; TP, pp. 321-322). 
The transcripts of the Lectures on Logic faithfully reflect this lexical fluctuation, even 
within a single group of notes, where the nouns ‘understanding’ (Verstand) and ‘reason’ 
(Vernunft), mostly accompanied by the adjective allgemein, but also in rarer cases by the less 
common gemeinschaftlich, alternate without any discernible distinction (cf. e.g. AA, XXIV/2, 
pp. 552, 628, 794, 833, 871, 874). However, it is the concept of ‘universal human reason’ 
(allgemeine Menschenvernunft) that progressively gained currency in the Kantian lexicon as 
an anthropological and logical notion. Its role is not merely to describe; it does not aim simply 
to give account of the fact that reason belongs to everyone and no one at the same time. It is 
more radically functional, in that it contains the rules of behavior that are to be followed.
4
 
In The Vienna Logic, which may be dated with some degree of certainty to the early 
‘Eighties, Kant recalls the argument set out in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer: 
Providence has directed, however, that we expound our judgments to universal 
[human] reason [allgemeine Menschenvernunft], and has places in us the drive to do 
this. […] If it does not happen that we lay our thoughts before universal human 
reason, then we have cause to call into question the validity of our judgments, 
because we do not wish to follow nature’s wise precept that we test our truth on the 
judgments of others. (AA, XXIV, p. 874; LL, p. 323) 
Evidently, Kant has a clearly marked objective to identify a sort of ‘functional 
structure’ of “universal human reason”, which by its very nature is afflicted with 
                                                          
3
 On Meier’s influence on Kant see: Hinske (1993), Rumore (2005, pp. XXXI-XXVI), Macor (2013b). 
4
 For an initial treatment of the concept ‘universal human reason’ in Kant, see: Hinske (1980, pp. 35-43; 1990, 
pp. 85-86; 1998, pp. 74-90). 
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“imperfections” (Refl 2269, AA, XVI, p. 293). It is no coincidence that the clearest argument 
in this connection may be found in The discipline of pure reason with regard to its polemical 
use: 
 
One can regard the critique of pure reason as the true court of justice for all 
controversies of pure reason; for the critique […] is rather set the task of 
determining and judging what is lawful in reason in general in accordance with its 
principles in its primary institution. 
Without this, reason is as it were in the state of nature, and it cannot make its 
assertions and claims valid or secure them except through war. The critique, on the 
contrary, which derives all decisions from the ground-rules of its own constitution, 
whose authority no one can doubt, grants us the peace of a state of law, in which we 
should not conduct our controversy except by due process. What brings the quarrel 
in the state of nature to an end is a victory, of which both sides boast, although for 
the most part there follows only an uncertain peace […]; but in the state of law it is 
the verdict, which, since it goes to the origins of the controversies themselves, must 
secure a perpetual peace. […] 
[…] human reason […] recognizes no other judge than universal human reason itself 
[allgemeine Menschenvernunft], in which everyone has a voice. (KrV, A 751-752/B 
779-780; CPR, pp. 649-650)
5
 
In other words, ‘universal human reason’ already contains an indication of how to 
relate to the others’ ‘universal human reason’, which is equally as reliable because it is 
‘universal’, and equally as limited because it is ‘human’. The only genuine attitude is one that 
is rooted in the awareness of the twofold nature of reason, which is at once necessary and 
insufficient, without radicalizing the positive moment, i.e. without undue absolutization, but 
also without hypostatizing the negative, and denying thereby the individual the possibility of 
attaining the truth. 
Structurally speaking, human reason is dual and dynamic in that it is divided internally 
into two functions that are different but interwoven, and must always keep the interrelation 
active. It confirms the validity of autonomous thought, a typical Enlightenment objective, 
while setting limitations designed to prevent it from falling back into a sort of solipsistic 
                                                          
5
 As usual, passages from the Critique of Pure Reason are referenced by numbers from ‘A’, the first edition of 
1781, and/or ‘B’, the second edition of 1787. Kant’s other writings are referenced using the following 
abbreviations: Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels=NTH; Anthropologie in pragmatischer 
Hinsicht=Anth, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?=WA, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der 
Sitten=GMS, Kritik der Urteilskraft=KU, Logik=Log, V-Lo/Philippi=Logik Philippi, Reflexion=Refl, Was heißt 
sich im Denken orientieren?=WDO. The abbreviations of critical edition and translations are listed in the 
bibliography. 
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epistemological perversion.
6
 Indeed, on the one hand, “the supreme touchstone of truth” 
resides “in oneself (i.e. in one’s own reason)” (WDO, AA, VIII, p. 147n.; RRT, p. 18, italics 
are mine), on the other it is found to exist also outside of us and our reason, as a “criterium 
veritatis externum” (Anth, AA, VII, p. 128; AHE, p. 240). In this latter case, it is to be sought 
in the ‘reason of others’, which acts as a corrective for inevitable mistakes individual reason 
will unavoidably make due to the myopia that a single viewpoint necessarily entails: man 
must “compare his prejudices with those of others and determine the truth based upon a 
relationship of concordance with the reason of others” (V-Lo/Philippi, AA, XXIV, p. 428), and 
“test his judgment by the understanding of others” as a necessary “touchstone” (Anth, AA, 
VII, p. 128; AHE, p. 240), otherwise bear the penalty of the uncertainty caused by the merely 
subjective, and therefore illusory nature of his convictions. 
Autonomous thought and emancipation from authority, but also from other forms of 
heteronomy such as the tyranny of passions or the hasty judgment, are not sufficient to ensure 
man’s effective growth in knowledge. If “Enlightenment” is “the human being’s emergence 
from his self-incurred minority” (WA, AA, VIII, p. 35; PP, p. 17) and “the maxim of always 
thinking for oneself” (WDO, AA, VIII, p. 146n.; RRT, p. 18n.), in other words, “liberation 
from superstition”, there is a further rule to prevent this liberation becoming the start of 
another form of subordination: “To think in the position of everyone else” (KU, AA, V, p. 
294; CPJ, p. 174). 
Clearly, the concept of ‘universal human reason’ is not merely functional in that it 
contains an indication of how we must proceed in the pursuit of knowledge, but also explicitly 
polyphonic and open. Polyphonic because it is intrinsically plural and cannot be cut off from 
the judgment of others, open because it is conscious of this multi-voiced nature, it respects it 
and makes it the basis of reasoning: it is not only a matter of listening, because we in fact put 
ourselves in the perspective of others. In Kant’s own words, “reason is not designed to isolate 
itself, but to enter into community [Die Vernunft ist nicht dazu gemacht, daß sie sich isolire, 
sondern in Gemeinschaft setze]” (Refl 897, AA, XV, p. 392).7 
                                                          
6
 On the key idea of ‘autonomous thought’ (Selbstdenken) in Kant and in the German Enlightenment see: Hinske 
(1986), Otto and Zammito (2001), Micheli (2007), Macor (2010, pp. 73-99). 
7
 On the contrary, in the Analytic of Principles of the first Critique Kant defines the understanding as “an island, 
[…] enclosed in unalterable boundaries by nature itself” (KrV, A 235/B 294; CPR, p. 339). On this passage see 
Sgarbi (2013, pp. 164-165) and Macor (forthcoming). 
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3.  Pluralism and Broad-Minded Way of Thinking 
 
The duplicity of the universal human reason gives rise to a series of concepts which 
become crucial for Kant and which ensure enduring validity to the logical and 
anthropological, but also more generally cultural, reflection which underlies it. It is a complex 
of notions which Kant develops in answer to the need to hold in consideration both the 
‘universality’ and the ‘humanity’ of reason, causing him to spell out by articulating them the 
consequences implied in the model presented above. They are among others: ‘pluralism’ 
(Pluralismus) and ‘broad-minded way of thinking’ (erweiterte Denkungsart). Kant thematizes 
these concepts in the same contexts as the ones in which he speaks of the need to resort to the 
judgment of others, whether positive or negative, on the basis of the structure and nature of 
universal human reason. 
More or less simultaneously to the growing interest in universal human reason, the 
Reflections on Logic and the transcriptions of the Lectures on Logic show a parallel and 
correlated investigation into the “participatory reason [theilnehmende Vernunft]” (Refl 2147, 
AA, XVI, p. 252; Refl 2564, AA, XVI, p. 418). 
The goal to be achieved is to overcome one’s own narrow point of view, which, when 
made absolute, can degenerate into the exact opposite of autonomous thought, one of the key 
precepts of the Enlightenment, becoming a full-blown prejudice. Again, the source is Meier, 
who had seen in the excessive faith placed in one’s own point of view a prejudice which is as 
damaging as that of “excessive prestige (praeiudicium auctoritatis)”, and an equally damaging 
form of heteronomy: “logical egoism (egoismus logicus)” occurs when we accept or reject 
something, only “because it is we who support it”, it is the fruit of “arrogance and love of 
self” and predominates in “the greater part of scholars”, despite its being a “prejudice so 
shameful and pedantic that it does not even merit confutation” (Vernunftlehre, p. 277, § 202).8 
Kant is quite faithful in following Meier, and devotes a significant amount of attention 
to logical egoism, from the Reflections to the Lectures on Logic (cf. e.g. Refl 903, 1482, 1505, 
AA, XV, pp. 395, 662, 811; Refl 2147, AA, XVI, p. 252; Vo-Lo/Philippi, AA, XXIV, p. 428). 
                                                          
8
 Cf. also Auszug, p. 46, § 170. The prejudice of ‘logical egoism’ is an important innovation within the 
Enlightenment theory of prejudices, and in this regard I refer to: Schneiders (1983, pp. 315-318), Pozzo (2000, 
pp. 228-232), Macor (2009, pp. 103-104). 
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In The Blomberg Logic “[t]he prejudice of excessive trust placed in oneself is nothing other 
than egoism”, which is called either “cosmologicus, when one holds that there is no other 
thinking being, no world outside me”, or “logicus, when ones holds that he alone judges 
rationally, that no one else is in a position to judge something or better to be able to have 
insight into it” (AA, XXIV, p. 187; LL, p. 148). Elsewhere, Kant connects these two types of 
egoism: “The logical egoist considers it unnecessary also to test his judgment by the 
understanding of others”, but in so doing is concerned “with oneself as the whole world”, 
forgetting that he is in fact a “citizen of the world” (Anth, AA, VII, pp. 128, 130; AHE, pp. 
240, 241-242).
9
 
The opposite of logical egoism is obviously ‘pluralism’, also ‘logical’, which allows 
both the Enlightenment claim to independence of judgment and the need, which is equally as 
important to the Enlightenment, for comparison with the independence of judgment of others. 
Neither demand is ignored, as they integrate and mitigate each other. It is not a question of 
erasing the precept of emancipation from the guardianship of others from the Enlightenment’s 
Decalogue, but rather preventing anti-Enlightenment trends from arising. 
The threat posed by logical egoism is, however, only the negative side of the coin, 
because if it is true that the ‘humanity’ of reason means that no one can claim exclusive rights 
to the truth, its ‘universality’ means that everyone can at least claim ‘partial’ rights. In other 
words: no one can be sure of being right, but everyone can be sure of not being wrong. 
Indeed, Kant is convinced of the ‘impossibility of total error’ and asserts that “whereas 
in historical and empirical questions it is possible to be completely wrong, for example if one 
sets before the birth of Christ something that happened after, in rational judgments […] one 
must always be right, if one considers the thing from a well-defined point of view”, and this 
means not overlooking any opinion whatsoever, regardless of how absurd it may seem at first 
blush (Refl 2212, AA, XVI, p. 272). “Even in the most unreasonable opinions to have gained 
currency among men may some grain of truth be found” (NTH, AA, I, p. 227), since “[e]very 
error in which the human understanding can fall is only partial […], and in every erroneous 
judgment there must always lie something true. For a total error would be a complete 
opposition to the laws of the understanding and of reason” (Log, AA, IX, p. 54; LL, p. 561).10 
                                                          
9
 I examined the role of cosmopolitanism from this standpoint in Macor (2013b). 
10
 On Kant’s theory of the impossibility of total error, see: Hinske (1980, pp. 31-66). 
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Any thesis must clearly be faced looking first for what is valid, then for what is 
fallacious. Underlying the “conflict over truth [Streit über Warheit]” there is “a common 
interest [ein gemeinschaftlich interesse]”, which must be “participatory [theilnehmend], and 
not exclusive [außchliessend], selfish [selbstsüchtig] or egoistic [egoistisch]”; it must lead to 
“starting to note what the other is right about” – not about what he is wrong (Refl 2213, AA, 
XVI, p. 273). 
Kant’s exhortations to seek comparison with others are all the more significant in the 
light of these considerations, and the concept of ‘logical pluralism’ thus reveals unexpected 
depths. The logical egoist is a “Cyclops” who “needs one more eye that will enable him to see 
his object also from the standpoint of other men” (Refl 903, AA, XV, p. 395), and anyone who 
decides to renounce the “touchstone” represented by the agreement of the “understanding of 
others” is “abandoned to a play of thoughts in which he sees, acts, and judges, not in a 
common world, but rather in his own world (as in dreaming)”. Not without reason does Kant 
see the “only universal characteristic of madness” in the absolutization of the “logical private 
sense (sensus privatus)” (Anth, AA, VII, p. 219; AHE, p. 322). 
The distinction between “mere persuasion” and actual “conviction” is indeed based 
upon the “possibility of communicating” something and “finding it to be valid for the reason 
of every human being to take it to be true”, since “I cannot assert anything, i.e., pronounce it 
to be a judgment necessarily valid for everyone, except that produces conviction”, whereas “I 
can preserve persuasion for myself if I please to do so, but cannot and should not want to 
make it valid beyond myself” (KrV, A 821-822/B 849-850; CPR, p. 685). 
‘Broad-minded way of thinking’ is therefore an alternative expression aimed at 
defining the correct pluralistic approach. Not mere tolerance and co-existence, but active 
participation in the reasons of the other with a view to avoiding error on both sides. The 
“broad-minded way of thinking [erweiterte Denkungsart]” presupposes that one “sets himself 
apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment, within which so many others are 
as if bracketed, and reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint [allgemeiner 
Standpunkt] (which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others)” 
(KU, AA, V, p. 295; CPJ, p. 175). “To think oneself (in communication with human beings) 
Kant’s Universal human reason. A polyphonic, functional, and open concept 
Laura Anna Macor 
193 
 
_____________________________ 
Kant e-Prints. Campinas, Série 2, v. 8, n. 1, p.184-200 jan.– jun., 2013. 
 
 
into the place of every other person” is “the principle of liberals who adapt to the principles 
of others” (Anth, AA, VII, p. 228; AHE, p. 333).11 
Kant goes a step further by saying that comparison with others is a basis for redefining 
autonomous thought itself, which is not seen as a kind of preliminary to subsequent 
comparisons with other ‘autonomous thoughts’, as it is in fact conditioned in its very 
possibility to exist by the collective and pluralist dimension. 
To make use of one’s own reason means no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is 
supposed to assume something, whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the 
rule on which one assumes it into a universal principle [allgemeiner Grundsatz] for the use of 
reason. This test is one that everyone can apply to himself. (WDO, AA, VIII, p. 146n.; RRT, p. 
18n.) 
The universality of human reason clearly plays a decisive role in promoting this 
approach, starting from the vocabulary and the use of the adjective ‘universal’ (allgemein). 
The formulation of the categorical imperative is the clearest instance of the application of this 
precept, and the awareness of this finally frees Kant from any charge of despotism, moral 
emptiness, and sterile rationalism. 
I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should 
become a universal law. […] I ask myself: would I indeed be content that my maxim 
[…] should hold as a universal law (for myself as well as for others)? […] I ask 
myself only: can you also will that your maxim become a universal law? If not, then 
it is to be repudiated, and that not because of a disadvantage to you or even to others 
forthcoming from it but because it cannot fit as a principle into a possible giving of 
universal law. (GMS, AA, IV, pp. 402-403; PP, pp. 57-58)
12
 
The dual and dynamic structure of universal human reason thus represents a basis also 
for the most widely known definition of reason as the legislating faculty in the field of 
morality and serves to understand the extreme consistency and inner resilience of the Kantian 
system. Not even in the foundation of morals does Kant depart from the convictions acquired 
in the process of rethinking the Logic of Meier, and he keeps faith with the Enlightenment 
agenda while integrating it and moving beyond it in a decisive way. The ‘universality’ of 
human reason, and consequently moral law, is anything but an abstract universality divorced 
from the complexity of mundane reality and artificially juxtaposed to it. It is a universality 
                                                          
11
 On the ‘broad-minded way of thinking’ see also Zöller (2009) and Keienburg (2011, pp. 154-180). 
12
 For a rather different, but still interesting approach to this formulation of the categorical imperative see 
Darwall (2009). For a more historical analysis see Keienburg (2011, pp. 111-116). 
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founded upon the sometimes contradicting multiplicity of characteristics of human nature and 
intersubjectivity, so that one must navigate between prejudice and superstition, but cannot 
ignore it. It is thus not a kind of ‘cure’ for error that annihilates and erases it, but a cure that  
grows in and thanks to the error, which – as we have seen – may never be a total error. 
Surprisingly, and contrary to all subsequent misinterpretations, reason in Kant is functional, as 
it points the way, polyphonic, meaning that it is based upon a comparison between multiple 
voices, and open, implying in other words a kind of theoretical identification with the other 
over and above the mere coexistence of different opinions. 
Kant is proposing a full-blown cultural model, basing his call for tolerance, respect 
and integration on the very structure itself of human reason.
13
 Unfortunately, his insistence on 
the necessary ‘universal’ character of reason and moral law has contributed to making them 
synonymous with careless oversight of the uneven nature of reality, ineffectiveness, and 
utopia; it is fortunate, therefore, that there have also been voices outside the chorus. 
 
4. Hannah Arendt and Kantian Pluralism 
 
Given the evidently persistent validity of the pluralist model proposed by Kant, there 
should be no need for any particular affirmation. But the history of contemporary thought 
provides it nonetheless, and in the new departure for eighteenth-century scholarship which has 
been taking place for the last decades it comes as a comfort and support.
14
 
Hannah Arendt is one of the most insightful and at the same time – as surprising as it 
may seem – one of the most historically faithful interpreters of Kant’s thought. However, the 
innovative and genuinely ‘contemporary’ character that has justly been attributed to Arendt’s 
thought has overshadowed her indebtedness to the philosophical tradition of the German 
Enlightenment, in which she was educated and to which she repeatedly claimed to belong. 
For me, Germany means my mother tongue, philosophy, and literature. (Hannah 
Arendt to Karl Jaspers, Berlin, 1
st
 January 1733, AJ, p. 16) 
                                                          
13
 For the cultural relevance of Kant’s pluralism and its roots in the Western philosophical tradition cf. Hinske 
(2009), Macor (2011, pp. 133-137). 
14
 As a matter of fact, the criticism of one-sided readings of eighteenth-century claims to truth and universality is 
currently the focus of philosophical, literary, and theological studies and is leading to a new narrative of the 
(German) Enlightenment, finally freed from charges à la Horkeimer and Adorno. On this see: Jamme and Kurz 
(1988); Deligiorgi (2005, pp. 161-169); Cataldi Madonna (2007); Macor (2011); Stockhorst (2013). 
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I was interested neither in history nor in politics when I was young. If I can be said 
to ‘have come from anywhere’, it is from the tradition of German philosophy. 
(Hannah Arendt to Gershom Scholem, 24
th
 July 1963, JP, pp. 245-246)
15
 
The focal point of her affiliation is her appropriation of the cultural model of dialogue, 
the inclusion of the point of view of others, the recognition of otherness, features which in 
fact give rise to themes which may ostensibly be attributed exclusively to the political and 
cultural climate of the twentieth century. 
In The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question (1932), Arendt focused on the duplicity 
of human reason as the main theoretical and cultural contribution of the German 
Enlightenment: on the one hand, “reason is shared by all men, is equally accessible to all 
people in all ages”, and “the universal rule of reason is the universal rule of what is human 
and humane”, whereas on the other “[p]ure reason […] is ‘scattered’ across the earth” and 
“never exists as itself”, but it “shifts, changes”. “This constantly changed shape depends on 
realities that lie outside human powers, on ‘time, climate, need, world, fate’” (JW, pp. 8, 4, 
11). 
Arendt thus adopts the idea that universal human reason is differentiated between 
individuals on the basis of the same limitations Kant had frequently referred to as insuperable 
and characteristic of the ‘humanity’ of reason. After the Second World War and the 
Holocaust, Arendt continued to assert the importance of the German Enlightenment from a 
cultural standpoint, focusing again on a pluralistic model of knowledge, which became the 
basis for an overall revision of man and his world. Throughout the period between 1959 and 
the ‘Seventies, in other words the entire period of her mature thought, the importance of the 
German Enlightenment showed no signs of diminishing.
16
 On the contrary, it appeared to 
become increasingly relevant and consistent in the way it decisively inspired Arendt in her 
thinking about politics and, more generally, culture: the traces of a correct understanding of 
                                                          
15
 That the German tradition of which Arendt speaks here is German Enlightenment is proved not only by the 
pervasive influence of authors such as Lessing and Mendelssohn, not to mention Kant, but also by the 
biographical fact that from the late ‘Twenties onwards Arendt pays close attention to the historical, political, 
cultural, and literary context of the late eighteenth century, frequenting the circle of scholars of German studies 
that formed in Heidelberg around the figure of Friedrich Gundolf, exchanging views with Benno von Wiese in 
particular, and the fact that she devoted herself to writing essays on the condition of Jews in Germany in the late 
Enlightenment and Romantic periods, as well as to the biography of Rahel Varnhagen. For reference, although 
an in-depth monograph has yet to be written, see: Young-Bruehl (1982), Robertson (1999, pp. 66-69), Macor 
(2011, pp. 137-140). 
16
 Consider for example Arendt’s speech on On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts About Lessing during the 
award-winning ceremony for the prize that carries his name (MDT, pp. 3-31). 
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dialogue are identified in eighteenth-century thought, and Kant in particular gradually 
acquires the status of an almost exclusive interlocutor. As expected, it is the concepts derived 
from that of ‘universal human reason’ that exert the greatest influence. 
According to Arendt, “critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut 
itself off from ‘all others’”, since “by the force of imagination it makes the others present and 
thus moves in a space that is potentially public, open to all sides; in other words, it adopts the 
position of Kant’s world citizen”, and “[t]o think with an enlarged mentality means that one 
trains one’s imagination to go visiting” (Lectures, p. 43). This alignment holds universality as 
its point of reference, because “[t]he greater the reach–the larger the realm in which the 
enlightened individual is able to move from standpoint to standpoint–the more ‘general’ will 
be his thinking”. A point of clarification: “This generality, however, is not the generality of 
the concept–for example, the concept ‘house’, under which one can then subsume various 
kinds of individual buildings. It is, on the contrary, closely connected with particulars, with 
the particular conditions of the standpoints one has to go through in order to arrive at one’s 
‘general standpoint’” (Lectures, pp. 43-44). 
In other words, Arendt fully captures the extremely dynamic character of the Kantian 
concept of reason and seeks to avoid simplistic and wholesale misinterpretations based on a 
purely abstract and artificial reading, emphasizing how the individual remains present in this 
universality, which could not exist without the partiality of individual points of view.
17
 
 In sum, whether in relation to historical or theoretical investigations, universal human 
reason proves to be a pivotal concept not only for understanding Kant’s thought, but also if it 
is to do justice to the German Enlightenment and its persistent validity. 
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